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During  the  past  forty  years  the  United  States 
government  has  made  numerous  attempts  to  restrain 
wage  and  price  increases.  Initially  these  were  asso- 
ciated  with  comprehensive  wartime  economic  con- 
trols,  as in World  War  II  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the 
Korean  War.  Several  varieties  of  wage-price  re- 
straint  were  even  attempted  during  the  Viet  Nam  era. 
President  Kennedy  introduced  “guideposts”  in  1962 
which  were  to  “provide  standards  . . . not  replace  the 
normal  processes  of  free  private  decisions.”  [3] 
Throughout  President  Johnson’s  tenure,  wage-price 
restraint  escalated  as  more  detailed  rules  were  estab- 
lished.  Although  the  Nixon  Administration  first 
eschewed  any  type  of wage-price  restraint,  it  imposed 
a  comprehensive  wage-price  freeze  in  August  1971. 
Controls  of varying  severity  were  maintained  through 
April  1974. 
Recently,  even  without  the  excuse  of war,  attempts 
to  restrain  individual  wages  and  prices  have  remained 
remarkably  durable.  President  Ford  announced  a 
“Whip  Inflation  Now”  program  in  October  1974 
which  included  a  token  mention  of  wage-price  re- 
straint.  President  Carter  has  announced  several  ver- 
sions  of  wage-price  restraint,  the  last  of  which  was 
put  forward  in  October  1978.l  Other  modern  indus- 
trial  nations  with  market  economies  have  also  made 
numerous  attempts  at  wage-price  restraint.  And 
throughout  history  wage-price  restraint  has  been  re- 
peatedly  attempted  in  preindustrial  societies. 
Based  on  its  frequency  of  use,  one  might  conclude 
that  wage-price  restraint  is  a  panacea.  Yet  on  eco- 
1 The  latest  program  involves  quasi-voluntary  wage  and 
price  standards.  Violators  are  explicitly  threatened  with 
bad  publicity  and  loss  of  government  contracts.  Im- 
plicitly,  possible  violators  must  be  aware  of  potential 
retaliation  by  regulatory  agencies  not  formally  incor- 
porated  in  the  wage-price  control  program.  For  example, 
the  Carter  Administration  has  recently  hinted  [11]  that 
the  amount  of  future  trucking  industry  deregulation  (by 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  or  by  act  of  Con- 
gress)  will  depend  on  the  outcome  of  Teamster  wage 
negotiations.  Due  to  the  magnitude  of  discretionary  au- 
thority  possessed  by  the  Internal  Revenue  Service, 
Environmental  Protection  Agency,  Federal  Trade  Com- 
mission,  Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Administration, 
etc.,  a  large  potential  for  retaliation  confronts  any  busi- 
ness. 
nomic  and  other  grounds,  such  restraint  has  been 
charged  with  creating  many  severe  difficulties  while 
failing  to  curb  inflation.  This  article  delineates  the 
persistent  puzzle,  continued  advocacy  of  wage-price 
restraint  by  those  who  are  well  aware  of  its  many 
drawbacks.  Accordingly,  some  of  the  more  obvious 
shortcomings  of  wage-price  restraint  are  first  re- 
viewed.  Second,  a theoretical  case  for  such  restraint, 
shortcomings  notwithstanding,  is  explained.  In 
short,  this  article  will  present  both  the  modern  theory 
behind  wage-price  restraint  as  well  as  some  severe, 
predictable  pitfalls  common  to  all  control  programs. 
PRELIMINARY  TOPICS 
Effectiveness  In  subsequent  parts  of  the  article 
it  will  be  assumed,  for  purposes  of  discussion,  that 
wage-price  restraint  programs  can  be  effective. 
However,  this  assumption  may  not  be  valid,  since 
wage-price  restraint  conflicts  with  a  basic  human 
characteristic,  the  desire  of  individuals  to  improve 
their  own  welfare  through  trade.  If  each  party  in- 
volved  in  a  transaction  agrees  to  the  price,  or  terms 
of  trade,  then  clearly  they  believe  the  transaction  to 
be  mutually  beneficial.  Thus  controllers  seeking  to 
prohibit  such  transactions,  on  the  grounds  that  the 
terms  of  trade  conflict  with  policy  objectives,  should 
not  be  surprised  that  the  traders  are  willing  to  cir- 
cumvent  price  regulations. 
For  example,  although  the  sticker  price  of  a  new 
car  might  be  frozen  by  law,  a dealer  can  always  vary 
the  trade-in  allowance,  warranty  terms,  credit  terms, 
predelivery  preparation,  etc.  Similarly,  automobile 
manufacturers  can  vary  the  options  included  or  ex- 
cluded  on  the  same  model,  or  introduce  a  new  model 
that  is  only  superficially  different  from  the  old. 
Since  prices  of  new  products,  or  new  models  of  old 
products,  are  difficult  to  regulate,  exchange  may  actu- 
ally  occur  at  the  same  quality  adjusted  price  that 
would  prevail  in  the  absence  of  a  price  freeze. 
Wage  controls  can  also  be  circumvented.  For 
one  thing,  employers  may  upgrade  workers’  jobs  in 
name  only,  a  difficult  practice  to  detect.  As  an 
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While  it  would  probably  first  attempt  to  hire  skilled 
workers  at  prevailing  wages,  it  might  not  receive  a 
sufficient  response,  in  which  case  it  might  choose  to 
raise  its  wage  offers.  If  confronted  with  wage  con- 
trols,  the  newcomer  might  label  its  machinists  “assis- 
tant  mechanical  engineers”  and  offer  a  higher  wage. 
Price  controllers  may  not  realize  that  the  jobs  are 
the  same,  albeit  with  different  titles.  If  not,  existing 
firms,  who  continue  to  pay  the  controlled  wage  rate, 
must  find  some  way  of  making  their  jobs  more  re- 
warding  if  they  are  to  retain  their  employees. 
In  principle,  given  enough  information,  vigorous 
enforcement,  and  a  legal  staff  large  enough  to  either 
write  clear  regulations  or  litigate  ambiguous  ones, 
evasions  could  be  controlled.  In  practice,  however, 
the  quantity  of information  required  to  evaluate  prod- 
uct  quality  and  to  classify  employee  functions  is 
enormous.  Moreover,  much  of  the  data  is  rapidly 
changing.  But  if  this  information  is  not  timely  and 
acquired  in  useful  form,  evasion  is both  possible  and 
profitable.  At  the  very  least,  therefore,  any  discussion 
of  wage-price  restraint  should  consider  the  high  cost 
of  obtaining  and  evaluating  information,  as  well  as 
the  cost  of  specifying  clear  regulations. 
It  should  not  be  assumed  that  an  ineffective  at- 
tempt  to  control  wages  and  prices  indicates  lack  of 
will  by  controllers,  since  even  the  most  draconian 
control  measures  have  not  always  been  successful. 
For  example,  the  Roman  emperor  Diocletian  initiated 
a  program  of  wage-price  restraint  under  which  vio- 
lators  received  the  death  penalty.  One  account  re- 
ports  that  the  law  effected  “much  blood  shed  upon 
very  slight  and  trifling  accounts;  and  the  people 
brought  provisions  no  more  to  market.”  [6]  The 
program  “in  shambles”  was  abandoned  after  thirteen 
years. 
These  difficulties  notwithstanding,  the  remainder 
of  this  article  will  assume,  for  purposes  of  discussion, 
that  wage-price  restraint  is  able  to  hold  wages,  and 
prices  received  by  sellers,  below  market  levels.  This 
assumption  facilitates  the  discussion  of  some  predict- 
able  consequences  of  effective  wage  and  price  re- 
straint. 
Single  Market  Effects  A  basic  proposition  of 
economics  is that  if  a  price  is  set  below  the  market- 
clearing  level,  then  actions  by  both  buyers  and  sellers 
will  be  distorted.  At  an  artificially  low  price,  buyers 
wish  to  buy  more  than  sellers  wish  to  supply,  and  a 
shortage  results  in  that  market,  as  illustrated  in 
Figure  1.  Effective  price  control  programs  provide 
ample  illustrations  of  such  distorted  behavior.  A 
particularly  dramatic  example  was  the  televised 
drowning  of  baby  chickens  when  the  Nixon  program 
of  wage-price  restraint  froze  the  price  of  chickens 
while  simultaneously  exempting  the  price  of  grain 
included  in  chicken  feed.  Consequently  it  became 
less costly  to  kill  a baby  chicken  than  to  pay  high  feed 
prices  and  sell  the  grown  animal  at  the  low  controlled 
price. 
Distortions  created  by  price  controls  are  exacer- 
bated  in  an  open  economy.  When  a  commodity  is 
freely  traded  on  the  world  market,  the  domestic  price 
can  diverge  from  the  world  price  only  by  the  cost  of 
transportation.  If  the  domestic  price  is  kept  artifi- 
cially  below  the  world  price,  there  is no  incentive  for 
foreign  producers  to  sell  in  the  country  with  the 
controlled  price.  Moreover,  it  is  more  profitable  for 
domestic  producers  to  export  rather  than  sell  at  the 
controlled  price.  However,  if  prices  of  traded  goods 
are  not  controlled,  a  price  control  program  would  be 
limited  to  non-traded  commodities  such  as  haircuts 
and  local  telephone  calls. 
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seller  receives  is  below  the  market-clearing  level,  it 
does  not  follow  that  the  buyer  pays  a  below  market 
price.  If  shortages  occur  and  buyers  as  a  whole 
cannot  obtain  all  they  wish  at  the  controlled  price, 
individual  buyers  may  well  spend  valuable  time  and 
money  attempting  to  buy  the  scarce  good.  The  ex- 
pense  of  waiting  in  lengthened  queues,  as  well  as 
additional  search  for  a scarce  item,  are  both  included 
in  the  total  cost  of  an  item  to  a  buyer. 
A  recent  example  occurred  in  early  1974,  when 
the  ceiling  price  of  gasoline  was  set  at  an  artificially 
low  level.  When  predictable  shortages  occurred  in 
several  metropolitan  areas,  long  lines  appeared  at 
open  gas  stations.  Waits  of  well  over  an  hour  were 
common.  Some  dealers  made  it  possible  for  buyers 
to  avoid  the  lines  by  selling  gasoline  only  to  buyers 
of  overpriced  repair  services. 
Additionally,  middlemen  may  be  able  to  buy  at  the 
low,  controlled  price  and  sell  at  the  higher  price 
buyers  are  willing  to  pay.  “FEA  millionaires”  were 
recently  enriched  by  such  reselling  of  domestic  crude 
oil. 
In  short,  when  a  price  is  restrained  below  the 
market-clearing  level,  the  low  price  received  by  pro- 
ducers  discourages  production.  And  final  buyers 
confront  reduced  supply,  even  though  the  item’s  total 
cost  to  an  individual  buyer  may  well  be  no  lower 
than  in  an  uncontrolled  market. 
GENERAL  EFFECTS  OF  WAGE-PRICE  RESTRAINT 
Wage-Price  Restraint  as  a  Substitute  for  Mone- 
tary  and Fiscal  Restraint  While  economists  gen- 
erally  agree  that  monetary  and  fiscal  restraint  will 
eventually  lower  inflation,  such  restraint  will  also 
temporarily  lower  real  economic  growth,  possibly 
causing  a  severe  recession.  As  the  director  of  the 
Council  on  Wage  and  Price  Stability,  Barry  Bos- 
worth,  put  it,  “In  the  last  three  recessions,  on  aver- 
age  you  had  to  throw  1  million  people  out  of  work 
in  order  to  get  1  percentage  point  off  the  rate  of 
inflation.  You  have  to  do  it  for  at  least  2 years  and 
each  year  you  lose  about  $75  billion  worth  of  GNP.” 
[12] 
In  light  of  this  high  cost,  policymakers  often  refuse 
to  lower  inflation  by  lowering  aggregate  demand 
through  monetary  or  fiscal  restraint.  Rather,  wage- 
price  restraint  is advocated  in place  of lowered  aggre- 
gate  demand.  The  view  that  wage-price  restraint 
and  monetary-fiscal  restraint  are  substitutes  is  ex- 
emplified  by  Sherman  J.  Maisel,  a  former  governor 
of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  “Stable  prices  result 
primarily  from  either  severe  depressions  or  price- 
wage  controls.” 
Moreover,  the  record  of  American  policymakers 
also  indicates  that  wage-price  restraint  is  used  as  a 
substitute  for  monetary  and  fiscal  restraint.  During 
Phases  I  and  II  of  the  Nixon  wage  and  price  con- 
trols,  the  money  supply  (Ml)  grew  at  an  annual  rate 
of  7.5  percent  and  the  high  employment  deficit  aver- 
aged  1.2  percent  of  GNP  ; during  the  tenure  of  the 
Nixon  administration  before  Phase  I,  the  money 
supply  grew  at  an  annual  rate  of  5.2 percent  and  the 
high  employment  surplus  averaged  0.2  percent  of 
GNP.  Thus,  both  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  were 
less  restrictive  after  controls  were  imposed.2  Other 
American  experiences  with  wage-price  restraint  were 
generally  accompanied  by  expansionary  monetary  and 
fiscal  policies. 
When  wage-price  restraint  is  imposed  as  a  substi- 
tute  for  monetary  and  fiscal  restraint,  it unfortunately 
shifts  attention  from  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  to 
individual  prices  or  wages.  For  example,  shortly 
after  President  Carter  announced  the  October  1978 
wage-price  restraint  program,  the  mass  media  di- 
rected  considerable  attention  to  a  relatively  trivial 
matter,  the  rising  price  of  Hershey  chocolate  bars. 
The  monthly  report  on  policy  action  released  by  the 
Federal  Open  Market  Committee  received  almost  no 
coverage.  However,  had  the  President,  in  his  tele- 
vised  address,  substituted  a  discussion  of  monetary 
policy  for  his  lengthy  discussion  of  single  prices  and 
wages,  reporters  might  have  paid  more  attention  to 
the  FOMC.  At  worst,  this  distracted  attention  can 
degenerate  into  a  search  for  scapegoats  while  mone- 
tary  and  fiscal  expansion  remain  unchecked. 
A  General  Output  Effect  There  is  another,  often 
overlooked  effect  of  wage-price  restraint  when  used 
as  a  substitute  for  monetary  and  fiscal  restraint. 
Whenever  a  price  level  which  cannot  freely  adjust 
is  inconsistent  with  the  existing  level  of  aggregate 
demand  and  high  output,  the  economy  can  encounter 
macroeconomic  disequilibrium. 
Robert  Barro  and  Herschel  Grossman  have  pro- 
vided  an  incisive  analysis  of  such  disequilibrium. 
Both  the  informal  discussion  of  this  section  and  an 
2 A  myopic  measure  of  monetary  policy,  looking  no 
earlier  than  May  1971.  nor  later  than  June  1972,  would 
show  the  opposite.  However,  most  economists  believe 
that  a few  months  is  too  short  to  establish  a policy,  since 
unrelated  influences  can  cause  abnormal  figures  in  short 
period  data.  Thus.  May-August  1971  would  not  be  taken 
as  indicative  of  precontrol  policy. 
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analysis  rely  heavily  on  the  Barro-Grossman  presen- 
tation.3  While  this  method  of  analysis  generally  con- 
firms  conclusions  of  orthodox  macroeconomics,  its 
use  helps  divert  attention  from  minor  issues  which 
have  often  obscured  more  important  topics.  One 
very  important  topic  highlighted  by  Barro-Grossman 
is  the  macroeconomic  importance  of  wage  and  price 
levels.  A  conclusion  of  this  analysis  is  that  when 
inflexible  price  and  wage  levels  are  too  low  (as 
would  happen  when  wage-price  restraint  is effective) 
the  result  is  macroeconomic  disequilibrium,  in  this 
case  labeled  general  excess  demand.  Consequences  of 
general  excess  demand  include  involuntary  unem- 
ployment  and  reduced  production,  exactly  as  would 
be  expected  from  a  recession.  When  general  excess 
demand  exists,  economic  recovery  can  occur  only  if 
(1)  prices  and  wages  rise,  or  (2)  aggregate  demand 
is  lowered  by  monetary-fiscal  restraint. 
To  understand  these  results,  consider  the  essen- 
tials  of a very  simple  disequilibrium  model,  containing 
(1)  a household  sector,  whose  members  supply  labor 
and  purchase  commodities,  (2)  firms  which  purchase 
labor  and  supply  commodities,  (3)  a  government 
which  can  create  or  destroy  money,  levy  taxes,  and 
buy  commodities,  and  (4)  price  and  wage  levels 
which  are  realized  as  the  outcome  of  all  private  and 
governmental  decisions.  When  the  economy  func- 
tions  normally,  price  and  wage  levels  adjust  so  that 
output  and  employment  are  at  high  levels.  For  ex- 
ample,  if  the  money  supply4  were  to  rise  in  an  econ- 
omy  with  full  employment,  thereby  raising  aggregate 
demand,  prices  and  wages  normally  would  increase. 
However,  if  aggregate  demand  is  greater  than  the 
economy  can  supply  at  current  price  and  wage  levels, 
but  prices  and  wages  are  legally  frozen,  then  some- 
thing  else  has  to  give.  And  an  output-employment 
fall  is  the  only  “give”  left  in  the  system. 
Moreover,  the  fall  is  more  severe  than  might  be 
expected  from  looking  only  at  single  markets.  Dis- 
locations  in  one  market  can  aggravate  problems  in 
another  market  and  vice  versa.  If  prices  are  too  low 
3 But  any  shortcomings  in  this  article  naturally  are  the 
responsibility  of  the  author. 
4 An  increase  in  the  money  supply  is  used  as  an  example 
of  a  change  which  affects  aggregate  demand.  This  cate- 
gory  also  includes  changes  in  government  spending, 
taxes,  household  preferences  for  current  relative  to  future 
consumption,  and  in  more  complex  models,  changes  in 
investment  decisions  of  firms  and  net  exports.  Since  the 
origin  of  an  aggregate  demand  change  is  of  secondary 
importance  in  discussing  its  qualitative  effects,  for  ease  of 
exposition  the  example  of  a  money  supply  change  will 
continue  to  be  used  as  an  example  of  a  change  affecting 
aggregate  demand. 
to  equilibrate  demand  with  available  supply,  house- 
holds  will  not  be able  to  buy  all  the  commodities  they 
wish,  and  they  will  thus  tend  to  substitute  current 
leisure  for  unavailable  current  consumption.  Since 
more  current  leisure  means  less  current  work,  firms 
will  be  unable  to  obtain  the  amount  of  labor  they 
seek.  However,  a reduced  amount  of labor  employed 
limits  the  amount  of  commodities  firms  can  produce. 
In  this  manner  an  initial  disturbance  can  cause  self- 
reinforcing  output-employment  declines  throughout 
the  economy. 
In  short,  output  and  employment  fall  when  there  is 
inconsistency  among  (1)  high  output  and  employ- 
ment  levels,  (2)  fixed  price  and  wage  levels,  and 
(3)  the  prevailing  level  of  aggregate  demand.  If 
either  of  the  latter  two  elements  were  able  to  change, 
then  output  and  employment  could  rise.  Starting 
from  an  economy  experiencing  general  excess  de- 
mand,  recovery  could  thus  involve  allowing  prices 
and  wages  to  rise.  Alternatively,  lowering  aggregate 
demand,  possibly  by  cutting  the  money  supply,  could 
also  initiate  recovery. 
Fortunately,  general  excess  demand  has  not  been  a 
problem  in  industrialized,  market  economies.  Espe- 
cially  in  the  U.  S.  experience  with  wage-price  re- 
straint,  it  is  hard  to  see  any  sign  of  general  excess 
demand,  which  suggests  that  controls  may  have  been 
more  symbolic  than  real.  An  alternative  explanation 
might  be  that  single  market  distortions  were  promptly 
ameliorated  by  relaxing  controls  at  the  first  sign  of 
trouble.  Consequently,  the  price  level  could  rise  and 
there  would  not  be  enough  time  for  spillovers  among 
markets  to  generate  disequilibrium  and  a  general 
output  effects.5 
Additionally,  a  real  economy  has,  for  a  short  time, 
more  flexibility  than  the  simple  economy  described 
above.  Lower  inventories,  higher  unfilled  orders, 
and  more  employee  overtime  could  be  immediate  re- 
sponses  to  an  aggregate  demand  increase.  But  there 
is a limit  to  the  flexibility  such  measures  can  provide. 
Inventories  cannot  fall  lower  than  zero,  and  employ- 
ees  will  not  accept  whatever  amount  of  overtime 
firms  propose.  Therefore,  while  an  economy  has 
many  responses  which  can  delay  the  onset  of  general 
excess  demand,  the  delay  is  only  temporary. 
Events  in  post-World  War  II  Germany  can  be 
interpreted  as  indicating  general  excess  demand,  al- 
5 Eastern  European  economies  might  be  studied  for 
general  excess  demand  effects,  due  to  their  rigid  prices 
and  expansive  aggregate  demand  policies.  However, 
necessary  data  on  output,  prices,  and  government  policies 
are  difficult  to  obtain  in  a  form  suitable  for  analysis. 
However,  see  Howard. 
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1936  the  Nazi  government  imposed  a  comprehensive 
price  freeze,  which  combined  with  wages  frozen  at 
1932  levels  to  yield  a  wage-price  restraint  policy 
which  outlasted  the  Nazi  government.  In  1945  the 
Allied  Control  Authority  maintained  German  price 
laws  as  well  as  local  price  control  agencies.  While 
it  may  not  be  surprising  that  a  totalitarian  police 
state  was  able  to  implement  effective  restraint,  even 
under  the  Allies  “price  control  during  the  first  three 
years  of  occupation  was  surprisingly  effective  .  .  . 
the  bulk  of  the  goods  changed  hand  at  legal  or 
nearly  legal  prices  .  .  .  legal  wages  prevailed 
throughout  the  economy.”  [9]  On  June  20,  1948, 
actions  were  taken  which  ultimately  cut  the  money 
supply  by  93  percent.  Simultaneously  much  wage- 
price  restraint  was  abandoned.  As  the  economy 
recovered  industrial  production  rose  at  an  annual 
rate  of 97 percent  between  June  and  November  1948. 
The  German  recovery  is  thus  similar  to  recovery 
from  general  excess  demand  as  modeled  in  this 
article.  In  both,  cutting  the  money  supply  and  re- 
laxing  wage-price  restraint  result  in  higher  output 
and  employment. 
To  summarize,  users  of  the  disequilibrium  model 
are  in the  position  of  predicting  the  danger  of  general 
excess  demand  on  the  basis  of  theory  unconfirmed  by 
strong  empirical  evidence.7  If  the  analysis  presented 
above  is  relevant,  then  to  ignore  the  possibility  of 
general  excess  demand  would  seem  to  imply  that 
necessary  conditions  to  create  it are  not  met.  That  is, 
either  wage-price  restraint  is  believed  to  be  ineffec- 
tive  or,  as  discussed  below,  it  is expected  to  be  used 
6 Any  discussion  of  the  postwar  German  experience 
should  mention  what  many  economists  would  refer  to 
as  a  severe  identification  problem.  The  identification 
problem  arises  because  any  economic  result  at  the  time 
can  be  plausibly  attributed  at  first  glance  to  numerous 
exceptional  causes.  One  explanation  of  low  output  might 
note  Allied  bombing  lowering  the  stock  of  business  fixed 
capital.  High  output  growth-rates  could  be  a catch-up  to 
more  normal  levels  or  a  result  of  Allied  aid,  notably  the 
Marshall  Plan.  Surprisingly,  Germany  had  substantial 
industrial  capacity  at  the  end  of  the  war.  Wallich  noted 
that  after  all allowing  for  in-slant  repairs,  more  capacity  was 
added  during  the war  than  was  destroyed.  He  also  noted 
that  while  Germany  received  $4.5  billion  in  Allied  aid, 
the  Allies  simultaneously  imposed  burdens  on  Germany 
including  reparations,  occupation  costs,  etc.  that  could 
offset  some,  or  all,  of  the  stimulating  effects  of  aid 
payments. 
Also,  the  data  available  are  distorted  by  the  pervasive 
black  markets.  hoarding.  and  bilateral  barter  of  the 
period.  For  example,  it is  hard  to  interpret  early  indus- 
trial  production  figures  due  to  hoarding  by  manufacturers 
(anticipating  the  relaxation  of  price  controls)  and  sales 
in  the  black  markets. 
7 But  the  same  approach  applied  to  another  problem,  the 
business  cycle  characterized  by  periods  of  general  excess 
supply,  has  better  empirical  support. 
as  a  complement  to,  rather  than  a  substitute  for, 
monetary  and  fiscal  restraint. 
Wage-Price  Restraint  as  a  Complement  to  Mone- 
tary-Fiscal  Restraint  As  discussed  above,  gen- 
eral  excess  demand  can  develop  if  prices  are  too  low. 
But  general  excess  demand  is  not  the  only  possible 
form  of  disequilibrium.  If  rigid  prices  and  wages  are 
too  high,  then  general  excess  supply  is possible.  For 
example,  suppose  that  the  economy  is  initially  pro- 
ducing  high  levels  of  output  and  employment.  Then 
suppose  that  the  money  supply  is  suddenly  reduced, 
with  prices  and  wages  not  immediately  changing.8 
The  fall  in  real  money  holdings  would  result  in  a fall 
in  the  household  sector’s  desired  level  of  consump- 
tion,  and  an  increase  in  their  desired  amount  of 
employment  (to  restore  some  of  their  lost  money 
holdings).  Firms,  however,  would  offer  less  em- 
ployment,  since  their  sales  are  down.  But  if  firms 
cut  the  amount  of  employment,  households  would  buy 
even  less,  leading  to  further  drops  in  sales,  jobs, 
income,  and  consumption. 
The  final  outcome  of  the  resulting  general  excess 
supply  is lower  output  and  employment.  The  reason- 
ing  behind  this  conclusion  is  analogous  to  the  rea- 
soning  that  general  excess  demand  causes  lower 
output  and  employment.  Both  general  excess  supply 
and  general  excess  demand  occur  when  inflexible 
wages  and  prices  are  inconsistent  with  government’s 
monetary  and  fiscal  policies,  households’  consump- 
tion  and  labor  supply choices,  firms’  production  and 
employment  choices,  and  high  output  and  employ- 
ment  levels.  To  restore  equilibrium,  one  of  two 
things  must  happen:  either  prices  and  wages  must 
adjust  to  appropriate  levels,  or  the  government’s 
monetary  and  fiscal  policies  must  adjust  aggregate 
demand  appropriately. 
The  contention  that  monetary-fiscal  restraint  is  a 
costly  way  to  lower  inflation  has  a  firm  foundation, 
namely  the  premise  that  such  restraint  would  entail 
a  period  of  genera1  excess  supply.  That  is,  for 
some  time  after  restraint  is  imposed  on  an  infla- 
tionary  economy,  prices  and  wages  would  be  too  high 
and  disequilibrium  would  develop.  Were  the  govern- 
ment  able  to  establish  equilibrium  levels  of  prices 
and  wages  at  the  initiation  of  monetary  and  fiscal 
restraint,  disequilibrium  could  be  avoided.  This  is  a 
major  reason  why  some  economists  continue  to  advo- 
8 The  Achilles  Heel  of  this  section  is  the  failure  to  show 
why  prices  and  wages  would  not  adjust  immediately  and 
completely.  An  earlier  discussion  relied  on  the  assump- 
tion  of  effective  wage-price  restraint.  One  approach, 
taken  by  Okun,  notes  that  in  an  uncertain  world  buyers 
and  sellers  can  benefit  from  formal  and  informal  long 
term  contracts  which  limit  price  and  wage  flexibility. 
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ance.9 
An  observant  reader  might  question  the  implicit 
contention  that  the  government  will  have  better  in- 
formation  on  appropriate  price  and  wage  levels  than 
do  households  and  firms.  After  all, the  only  informa- 
tion  possessed  exclusively  by  the  government  is  the 
course  of  monetary  and  fiscal  policy.  Thus,  it  would 
appear  that  simply  announcing  policy  changes  before 
they  went  into  effect  would  allow  the  private  sector 
to  adjust  smoothly  to  the  policy  change.  Unfortu- 
nately,  this  simple  solution  is probably  too  good  to  be 
true.  Government  policy  has  historically  been  so 
erratic  that  current  announcements  have  little  credi- 
bility.  Moreover,  formal  and  informal  contracts 
would  limit  immediate  price  or  wage  adjustment  in 
response  to  even  a  credible  announcement. 
Consequently,  if  one  believes  the  government  to 
possess  better  knowledge  than  the  private  sector  on 
appropriate  levels  of  wages  and  prices,  and  if  one 
believes  the  government  to  be  capable  of  promptly 
employing  this  knowledge  in wage-price  control,  then 
one  could  logically  support  temporary  wage-price 
restraint,  concurrent  with  monetary-fiscal  restraint. 
9 Another  economic  argument  for  wage-price  restraint 
rests  on  the  concept  of  administered  prices.  While  often 
stated  as  a  simplistic  conspiracy  theory  with  little  eco- 
nomic  content,  it  can  also  be  given  a  more  sophisticated 
form.  Imagine  an  economy  with  most  prices  determined 
by  firms  that  can  arbitrarily  move  price  within  a  zone  of 
control,  and  most  wages  set  by  unions  with  similar  eco- 
nomic  power.  Now  imagine  one  or  both  of  these  groups 
attempting  to  grab  a  larger  portion  of  national  income  by 
using  its  economic  power  to  push  up  prices  or  wages. 
That  group  could  be  successful,  at  least  temporarily,  if 
the  government  concurrently  expanded  aggregate  demand 
enough  so  that  sales  and  employment  were  not  reduced. 
The  result  of  this  expanded  aggregate  demand,.  however, 
is  inflation.  Wage-price  restraint,  it  is  argued,  is  the  best 
way  to  curb  this  “administrative  inflation.”  Means  has 
given  a classic  statement  of  this  doctrine. 
Even  in  its  most  sophisticated  form,  however,  many 
economists  do  not  find  the  argument  persuasive.  First, 
there  may  be  better  ways  to  limit  price  increases  in  con- 
centrated  industries.  For  example,  proponents  of  the 
administrative  inflation  doctrine  often  point  to  the  steel 
industry.  But  the  steel  industry  has  been  able  to  raise 
prices  only  because  the  government  has  limited  imports 
of  low  cost  foreign  steel.  Thus,  removal  of  import 
tariffs  and  quotas  would  allow  American  manufacturers 
to  purchase  low  cost  steel  without  wage-price  restraint. 
Also,  if  big  business  and  big  labor  have  enough  politi- 
cal  clout  to  induce  the  government  to  expand  aggregate 
demand  in  the  first  place,  they  probably  have  enough 
clout  to  influence  a wage-price  restraint  program  in  their 
favor.  Moreover,  it  is  not  clear  what  fraction  of  prices 
and  wages  are  administered,  how  large  are  the  zones  of 
price  control,  and  to  what  extent  members  of  a  group 
like  big  business  would  cooperate  rather  than  compete. 
Yet  these  are  all  crucial  elements  of  the  theory.  For 
example,  an  oligopolist  might  not  be  able  to  raise  its 
price  since  that  would  create  sufficient  profit  opportuni- 
ties  to  attract  new  competitors.  And  not  being-able  to 
raise  price  makes  the  theory  inapplicable.  Therefore, 
unless  these  questions  can  be  satisfactorily  answered,  it 
is  possible  to  accept  the  abstract  theory  without  seeing 
any  relevance  to  the  American  economy. 
Present  rhetoric  acknowledges  the  latter  part  of  this 
conclusion.  For  example,  President  Carter’s  chief 
inflation  fighter  Alfred  Kahn  has  stated  “it  has  been 
recognized  that  wage  and  price  controls  would  be 
futile  if  they  were  not  accompanied  by  really  quite 
stringent  budgetary  restraint  and  monetary  re- 
straint.”  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  political 
rhetoric  has  often  endorsed  demand  restraint  while 
simultaneous  actions  produced  monetary-fiscal  ex- 
pansion. 
CONCLUSION 
Economic  activity  consists  of  the  production  and 
exchange  of  goods  and  services.  A  person  may  ex- 
change  productive  labor  for  money  wages,  and  at  a 
different  time  trade  the  money  for  any  of  numerous 
commodities.  Trades  are  made  whenever  each  party 
concerned  believes  the  transaction  will  improve  his 
own  well-being.  Wage-price  controls,  however,  seek 
to  prohibit  certain  of  these  mutually  beneficial  trans- 
actions.  In  so  doing,  controls  conflict  with  a  very 
powerful  human  motivation,  the  desire  to  improve 
one’s  own  well-being.  Therefore  it  is  not  clear  that 
controls  will  actually  succeed  in  prohibiting  trans- 
actions. 
Even  if  the  central  authority  does  successfully 
limit  the  transactions  people  can  make,  it  does  not 
follow  that  the  effects  will  be  desirable.  Since  gov- 
ernments  are  limited  in  the  amount  of  information 
they  can  acquire  and  process,  and  make  decisions 
slowly,  if at  all,  single  market  distortions  are  inevita- 
ble  when  controls  are  effective.  Dogged  controllers, 
undeterred  by  such  distortions,  could  cause  general 
excess  demand  unless  they  were  to  follow  the  unusual 
procedure  of  concurrently  restricting  aggregate  de- 
mand  by  monetary  or  fiscal  policy. 
And  even  if  aggregate  demand  restraint  is  con- 
currently  employed,  and  if  single  market  effects  are 
not  severe,  wage-price  controls  still  may  not  have  a 
desirable  impact  on  the  economy.  The  theoretical 
argument  that  controls  will  allow  the  economy  to 
avoid  general  excess  supply  requires  not  only  that 
the  government  be  better  able  to  identify  appropriate 
price  and  wage  levels  than  the  market  process,  but 
also  to  be  able  to  act  expeditiously  upon  that  knowl- 
edge.  Both  requirements  are  stringent,  and  demand 
a  higher  level  of  governmental  competence  than  is 
actually  observed. 
Therefore,  employing  wage-price  restraint  to  battle 
inflation  might  well  prove  to  be  the  Viet  Nam  of 
economic  policy.  That  is,  the  battle  is  likely  to  be 
protracted,  with  no  light  at  the  end  of  the  tunnel,  and 
with  burdens  on  the  population  mounting  as the  battle 
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Viet  Nam  strategy  is appropriate  for  wage  and  price 
controls.  That  is,  declare  victory  over  inflation  if 
necessary,  but  end  the  controls  program  immediately. 
APPENDIX 
This  appendix  uses  a  simplified  model  economy  to 
examine  macroeconomic  disequilibrium.  After  the 
basic  features  of  the  economy  are  presented,  sup- 
pressed  inflation  is  studied  in  Part  I.  A  more  tradi- 
tional  recession  is analyzed  in  Part  II,  as  a  first  step 
towards  explaining  a  rationale  sometimes  given  for 
wage-price  restraint.  The  disequilibrium  model  pre- 
sented  is  quite  flexible,  and  can  be  applied  to  a  wide 
range  of  macroeconomic  problems. 
I.  GENERAL  EXCESS  DEMAND 
The  Basic  Model  Imagine  an  economy  with 
three  markets:  output  (Y),  labor  (L),  and  money 
(M);  three  types  of  decision  makers  :  firms,  house- 
holds,  and  a government;  and  two  prices  : the  price  of 
commodity  output  (P)  and  the  price  of  labor  (W). 
Households  and  firms  engage  in  economic  activity  in 
their  own  self-interest,  and  no  attempt  is  made  to 
explain  why  the  government  engages  in  economic 
activity. 
Households  make  two  economic  decisions:  how 
much  output  to  buy  and  how  much  labor  to  sell.  It  is 
assumed  that  the  higher  the  real  wage  (W/P)  or  the 
higher  their  real  money  balances  (M/P),  the  more 
output  households  wish  to  consume  (Cd).  While  a 
higher  real  wage  is  assumed  to  induce  households  to 
supply  more  labor  (Ls),  it  is  assumed  that  house- 
holds  who  are  wealthier  because  of  higher  real  money 
balances  enjoy  their  additional  wealth  by  consuming 
both  additional  output  and  additional  leisure.  Since 
more  leisure  means  less  work,  increasing  real  money 
balances  will  lower  the  labor  supply  schedule  (that  is, 
the  amounts  of  labor  potentially  offered  at  each  pos- 
sible  wage  rate). 
Firms  decide  how  much  output  they  produce  (Ys); 
their  labor  demand  (Ld)  is  the  quantity  of  labor 
needed  to  produce Ys.10 An  increase  in the  real  wage 
rate  lowers  the  demand  for  labor  and  thus,  with  less 
labor  employed,  a  smaller  amount  of  output  is  pro- 
duced.  Government  obtains  funds  to  purchase  output 
(G)  by  taxing  households  or  printing  money.  Ag- 
10 More  precisely,  there  is  an  aggregate  production  func- 
tion  F  such  that  Y  =  F(L);  moveover,  it  is  also  as- 
sumed  that  the  quantity  produced  is  equal  to  the  quantity 
sold. 
gregate  commodity  demand  (Yd)  is  the  sum  of  de- 
mands  by  households  and  the  government. 
For  the  commodity  market  to  be  in  equilibrium,  it 
is  necessary  that  Ys  =  Cd +  G;  for  labor  market 
equilibrium,  Ls  =  Ld.  If  these  two  markets  are  in 
equilibrium,  so  must  the  money  market11  and  the 
model  economy  consequently  exhibits  general  equi- 
librium.  If  Ld  >  Ls and  Cd +  G  >  Ys, the  situation 
will.  be  labeled  general  excess  demand  (although 
general  here  refers  to  only  the  “real”  sectors  as 
opposed  to  the  monetary  sector). 
Persistent  Excess  Demand  Assume  that  there 
is  initially  a  general  equilibrium,  with  LO hours  of 
labor  and  YO units  of  output  exchanged  at  wage  WO 
and  price  PO.  Now  imagine  that  the  government 
prints  additional  money  (M  rises  from  MO to  M1) 
and  distributes  it  to  households.  A  first  analysis 
might  simply  note  (as  described  above)  that  the  in- 
crease  in  real  money  holdings  would  increase  house- 
hold  demand  for  output  but  decrease  household  labor 
supply  (by  increasing  the  demand  for  leisure).  If 
the  wage  and  price  levels  did  not  change,  there  would 
be excess  demand  in each  market,  as  shown  in  Figure 
2.  However,  a  sufficient  increase  in  the  price  1evel 
could  lower  Ml/P  to  MO/PO;  along  with  the  same 
percentage  increase  in  the  wage  level,  commodity 
demand  and  labor  supply  of  households  would  return 
to  their  original  values. 
Now  suppose  that  wage-price  restraint  is  imposed 
at  the  same  time  the  money  supply  is  increased.  If 
wages  and  prices  do  not  adjust  then  there  are  new 
questions  to  answer.  First,  what  quantities  are  ex- 
changed  in  each  market?  When  quantity  demanded 
is  equal  to  quantity  supplied,  the  answer  is  easy. 
But  now  quantity  demanded  is greater  than  quantity 
supplied.  The  answer  uses  the  assumption  that 
households  and  firms  engage  in  economic  activity  in 
their  own  self-interest,  and  are  not  forced  to  make 
any  transactions;  accordingly,  the  quantity  supplied 
is  the  quantity  exchanged.  Suppliers  do  not  wish  to 
supply  more  and  are  not  forced  to. 
While  a  naive  analysis  might  stop  here,  there  is 
another  problem.  Firms  cannot  buy  as  much  labor 
by  paying  WO as  they  could  before;  is  it  reasonable 
to  assume  an  unchanged  supply  of  output?  In  this 
simple  world,  cutting  back  labor  input  directly  lowers 
the  level  of  commodity  output.  As  shown  in  Figure 
3,  Ys’  is  the  effective  commodity  supply  given  the 
labor  market  constraint  on  the  amount  of  labor  firms 
11 This  follows  from  direct  application  of  Walras'  Law. 
Crouch  presents  an  unusually  clear  exposition  of  Walras’ 
Law. 
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households  supply  labor  in  order  to  receive  wages 
with  which  they  buy  output;  if  they  cannot  buy  all 
the  output  they  wish,  then  they  can  at  least  reduce 
their  labor  supply  and  have  more  leisure  time  to 
enjoy.  Thus  the  labor  supply  can  be  represented  as 
in  Figure  3  by  Ls’,  the  effective  supply  of  labor 
given  the  commodity  market  constraint  on  the 
amount  of  output  households  can  purchase. 
The  analysis  presented  above  can  be  summarized 
with  the  aid  of  a graph,  such  as  the  one  in  Figure  4, 
which  includes  effective  supply  curves  for  labor  and 
real  output,  Ls’ and  Ys’.  Demand  curves  are  omitted 
since  when  there  is  excess  demand,  exchange  is 
limited  to  the  amount  supplied.  At  point  A  both 
markets  are  in  equilibrium.  While  the  wage  and 
price  levels  are  restrained  at  WO and  PO  the  quantity 
of  money  is  increased  from  MO to  M1.  As  a  result 
there  are  excess  demands  in  the  labor  and  output 
markets.  Households  thus  face  a  supply  constraint 
on  consumption  and  firms  face  a  supply  constraint 
on  labor  purchases.  In  response,  households  reduce 
effective  labor  supply  and  firms  reduce  effective  out- 
put  supply.  The  final  outcome  yields  levels  of  em- 
ployment  and  output,  point  B,  significantly  below 
initial  levels. 
Recovery  The  economy  can  recover  and  move 
back  to  point  A  in  one  of  two  ways.  If  restraints 
are  removed  and  the  price  level  rises  enough  so  that 
M/P  returns  to  its  old  level,  and  there  is  an  equal 
percentage  increase  in  the  wage  level,  then  the  econ- 
omy  can  move  from  B  to  A.  If  wages  and  prices 
continue  to  be  restrained,  a cut  in the  money  supply12 
can  still  result  in  movement  from  B  to  A.  In  either 
case,  after  adjustment  W/P  =  WO/PO and  M/P  = 
MO/PO; therefore  Yd =  YS =  YO  and  Ld =  Ls =  LO. 
This  analysis  can  give  meaning  to  the  phrases  “too 
high”  or  “too  low”  a  price  and/or  wage  level.  At 
point  B  both  the  price  level  and  the  wage  level  are 
too  low,  since  increasing  both  would  increase  employ- 
ment  and  output.  One  of  the  hardest  tasks  in  learn- 
ing  economics  is  unlearning  oft-repeated  fallacies; 
one  such  fallacy  is  that  high  prices  are  bad  but  low 
prices  are  good.  As  has  been  seen,  if  low  prices  and 
wages  result  in  general  excess  demand,  then  the 
whole  economy  suffers. 
It  is  interesting  to  contrast  this  general  approach 
with  the  partial  analysis  of  viewing  equilibrium  in 
only  one  market,  as  in  Figure  2.  Imagine,  as  before, 
that  the  money  supply  increases  and,  consequently, 
households’  planned  purchases  rise.  In  the  market 
for  output  it  would  appear  that  lowering  the  real 
wage,  by  lowering W  with  P  unchanged,  would 
effect  a  new  equilibrium  at  an  output  level  higher 
than  YO.  A  general  analysis,  as  summarized  in 
Figure  3,  would  show  the  error  of  ignoring  the  labor 
market.  The  initial  shock  causes  a  movement  from 
A  to  B.  If  W  were  forced  down  with  P  unchanged, 
then  Ls’  would  shift  to  the  left,  resulting  in  even 
lower  output  and  employment  than  at  B. 
II.  GENERAL  EXCESS  SUPPLY 
Without  Continuing  Inflation  The  basic  model 
of  Part  I  will  be  used  to  examine  a  typical  recession, 
in  which  the  problem  is general  excess  supply  rather 
than  general  excess  demand.  Assume  that  initially 
there  is a general  equilibrium,  with  LO hours  of  labor 
and  YO units  of  output  exchanged  at  wage  WO and 
price  PO.  Now  suppose  that  the  money  supply  is 
suddenly  reduced  from  MO to  M2.  A  first  analysis 
might  simply  note  that  the  decrease  in  real  money 
holdings  would  decrease  household  demand  for  out- 
put  and  leisure.  Thus  if  wages  and  prices  did  not 
12 More  generally,  any  action  which  decreases  aggregate 
demand  can  be  substituted  for  a  cut  in  the  money  supply. 
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commodity  and  labor  markets.  However,  a  sufficient 
decrease  in  the  price  level  could  raise  M2/P  to 
MO/PO;  along  with  the  same  percentage  decrease  in 
the  wage  level,  Cd  and  Ls  would  return  to  their 
original  values. 
Now  suppose  that  wages  and  prices  cannot  fall  as 
much  as  described  above.  Consequently  there  is  still 
excess  supply  in each  market.  As  before,  when  quan- 
tities  supplied  and  demanded  are  not  equal,  the  lesser 
of  the  two  is the  quantity  traded.  Thus,  the  quantity 
demanded  is the  quantity  exchanged.  Also,  there  are 
spillovers  between  the  two  markets.  Firms  cannot 
sell as many  commodities  as in  equilibrium;  therefore 
they  have  a  smaller  labor  requirement.  Households 
cannot  sell all the  labor  they  wish;  this  fall  in  income 
lowers  their  planned  commodity  purchases.  Thus 
the  initial  shock  is  exacerbated  by  these  reinforcing 
spillovers.  In  other  words,  the  initial  aggregate  de- 
mand  shock  has  a  multiplier  effect. 
The  resulting  situation  is  illustrated  in  Figure  5 
with  effective  demand  curves  for  labor  and  commodi- 
ties.  Note  that  disequilibrium  does  not  result  from 
too  high  or  too  low  a real  wage  ; on  the  labor  market 
side,  the  real  wage  rate  can  vary  substantially  without 
affecting  the  quantity  of  labor  employed.  Effective 
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curves  are  omitted,  since  under  excess  supply,  ex- 
change  is limited  to  quantity  demanded.  The  initial 
demand  shock  is a reduction  in the  quantity  of  money 
from  MO to M2  with  the  wage  and  price  levels  stuck 
at  WO and  PO.  Consequently  there  is  general  excess 
supply.  The  final  outcome  entails  levels  of  output 
and  employment,  point  D,  significantly  below  initial 
levels.  Recovery  occurs  in  an  analogous  manner  to 
the  case  of  general  excess  demand.  Either  the  wage 
and  price  levels  must  fall,  or  the  money  supply  must 
rise,  so  that  W/P  =  WO/PO and  M/P  =  MO/PO. 
The  symmetry  of  general  excess  supply  and  gen- 
eral  excess  demand  is  illustrated  in  Figure  7.  It  is 
assumed  that  the  real  wage  is  WO/PO and  that  wage 
and  price  levels  are  frozen.  Then  there  is  one  quan- 
tity  of  money  at  which  output  is  at  its  maximum 
level,  YO.  A  lower  money  supply  results  in  general 
excess  supply  while  a  higher  money  supply  results  in 
general  excess  demand.  One  can  also  observe  the 
potential  importance  of  a  flexible  price  level,  which 
could  change  M/P  and  thus  raise  output  from  low 
disequilibrium  levels.  Similar  diagrams  can  be  used 
to  illustrate  effects  of  other  variables,  such  as govern- 
ment  spending  or  taxes. 
Recession  ‘with  Inflation  The  preceding  section 
presents  a  disequilibrium  model  of  a  recession  in  an 
economy  without  continuing  inflation.  In  this  sec- 
tion  an  ad  hoc  addition  is  made  to  the  basic  model 
so  that  continuing  inflation  is included.  The  purpose 
is  to  show  how  monetary-fiscal  restraint  can  trigger 
general  excess  supply,  and  how  this  might  be avoided 
by  perfectly  administered  wage-price  restraint. 
Suppose  that  in  every  month  for  the  past  10 years, 
the  money  supply  has  increased  by  1  percent,  al- 
though  the  monetary  authority  announced  at  various 
times  its  intention  of  slowing  money  growth.  In. the 
simple  economy  described  above,  general  equilibrium 
could  be  maintained  by  price  and  wage  levels  rising 
1  percent  per  month.  Furthermore,  imagine  the 
monetary  authority  again  announcing  its  intention 
of  slowing  money  growth  and  actually  stopping 
growth  completely.  Using  anticipations  (which  with 
perfect  hindsight  can  be  seen  to  be  incorrect)  based 
on  the  previous  10 years,  firms  and  households  might 
well  ignore  the  monetary  authority’s  announcement 
and  agree  to  wages  and  prices  1 percent  higher.  If 
the  higher  wage  and  price  levels  stuck,  there  would 
be  general  excess  supply,  as  described  above.  Real 
money  holdings  would  fall  as  the  price  level  rose 
and  the  money  supply  did  not  change  ; consequently, 
households  would  cut  purchase  plans.  As  a  result, 
firms  would  demand  less  labor.  But  if  households 
could  not  sell  their  desired  amount  of  labor  at  the 
going  wage,  they  would  lower  planned  purchases. 
Thus  monetary  restraint  would  cause  an  initial 
fall  in output  and  employment.  If  monetary  restraint 
were  maintained,  then  for  recovery  to  occur  it  would 
be  necessary  for  households  and  firms  to  correctly 
comprehend  the  monetary  action,  and  for  prices  and 
wages  to  adjust  accordingly.  However,  an  effective 
freeze  of  prices  and  wages  at  the  same  time  the 
money  supply  was  first  held  constant  would  avoid 
the  general  excess  supply  scenario.  Quantities  ex- 
changed  in  the  commodity  and  labor  markets  would 
not  fall  when  the  money  supply  is  lower  than  ex- 
pected.  This  happy  result  is  due  to  artificially  low 
price  and  wage  levels  being  consistent  with  the  unex- 
pectedly  low  money  supply  and  general  equilibrium. 
Even  in  this  simple  world,  there  are  quite  strong 
necessary  conditions  for  wage-price  restraint  to 
achieve  the  potential  output-employment  gains  men- 
tioned  above.  First,  prices  and  wages  must  not  auto- 
matically  fall  when  monetary  restraint  is  imposed 
(otherwise,  monetary  restraint  would  not  cause  gen- 
eral  excess  supply).  Next,  the  wage-price  controllers 
must  have  better  knowledge  of  the  extent  of  mone- 
tary  restraint  than  the  public  (otherwise,  the  public 
21  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  MAY/JUNE  1979 could  adjust  prices  and  wages  to  appropriate  levels 
without  intervention).  Finally,  wage-price  restraint 
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